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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is becoming more common for couples in the United States to have 
children with the help of In-Vitro Fertilization (IVF). One such couple turned 
to IVF when the wife was diagnosed with breast cancer. Delaying cancer 
treatment, the couple underwent IVF and cultivated 13 embryos for future 
use.1 After several months of aggressive cancer treatment, the wife recovered 
but was left unable to bear children naturally.2 Two years later, the couple 
divorced.3 Faced with distributing the frozen embryos, the couple reached an 
impasse: grant the embryos to the wife so that she could try to have children 
or grant them to the husband for donation or destruction.4 This couple's legal 
battle over the frozen embryos eventually reached the Pennsylvania Superior 
Court in Reber v. Reiss.5 
An issue of first impression, the Superior Court was faced with a 
common issue among state courts: how should frozen embryos, the products 
of assisted reproductive treatment, be distributed upon the divorce of the 
parents-to-be? The national debate regarding the legal status of embryos rages 
                                                             
∗ The author is a third-year student at the University of Pittsburgh 
School of Law. She would like to thank her family, friends and the staff of 
the Pittsburgh Journal of Environmental and Public Health for their support 
and guidance. 
1 Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131, 1132 (Pa. Super. 2012). 
2 Id. at 1133. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 1134. 
5 Id. 
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on, wavering from Louisiana's treatment of the embryos as a "biological 
human,"6 to Florida and California taking property-based contractual 
approaches.7 In addition to the implications to family law, the distribution of 
the embryos also creates unique implications for public health. Divorce, an 
already stressful and disruptive event for the American family,8 can be made 
more stressful by questions of ownership of frozen embryos. The future use 
of frozen embryos by parents who may wish to continue reproductive goals 
post-divorce are at stake in an already divisive and emotional process. This 
note will discuss the advantages of contract-based agreements to determine 
the distribution of frozen embryos upon divorce. Additionally, this note will 
make the argument that where contracts are unavailable, a special opportunity 
exists for the collaborative law process to take the place of the adversarial 
system in these disputes should contracts not be available. 
II. INFERTILITY AND DIVORCE ARE PUBLIC HEALTH ISSUES 
Infertility is not only a private medical struggle, but also a public health 
issue. According to the National Center for Health Statistics, "the general 
fertility rate declined to the lowest rate ever reported for the United States in 
                                                             
6 LA. REV. STAT. § 9:126 (2012). See also LA. REV. STAT. § 9:123 
(2012) ("An in vitro fertilized human ovum exists as a juridical person"). 
7 See generally F.S.A. § 742.17 (West 2013) ("Disposition of eggs, 
sperm, or pre-embryos; rights of inheritance"); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY 
CODE § 125315 (West 2013). 
8 A number of studies have shown that divorce has its own public health 
concerns including a higher correlation of divorcees having chronic 
conditions, limited mobility, depression in later life and higher mortality 
rates. See generally Mary Elizabeth Hughes & Linda J. Waite, Marital 
Biography and Health at Mid-life, 50 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAVIOR 344 
(2009); David A. Sbarra & Paul J. Nietert, Divorce and Death: Forty Years of 
the Charleston Heart Study, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 107 (2009). 
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2011."9 Prevention of infertility often includes public health concerns 
regarding the prevention and treatment of sexually transmitted diseases, 
obesity and weight-gain, exercise, and use of tobacco products and alcohol.10 
Furthermore, "environmental agents, delayed childbearing . . . and certain 
diseases" contribute to the presence of infertility.11 A system of prevention 
and treatment has grown so great that now not only is infertility a public 
health issue, but the potentially adverse effects of aggressive treatment are 
also public health concerns.12 While many people will seek to prevent 
infertility, many will engage in assisted reproductive treatment, or ART, 
which has public health consequences of its own.13 As the cost of treatment is 
borne individually, there are also disparate economic impacts of treatment on 
women and minorities; this is another concern for public health officials who 
administer public health programs.14 Additionally, preventing adverse effects 
                                                             
9 Brady E. Hamilton, Joyce A. Martin & Stephanie J. Ventura, Births: 
Preliminary Data for 2011, 61 NAT'L VITAL STAT. REP., no. 5, 2012 at 1, 
available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr61/nvsr61_05.pdf. 
10 Anne T. Fidler & Judith Bernstein, Infertility: From a Personal to a 
Public Health Problem, 114 PUB. HEALTH REP. 495, 498–500 (1999). 
11 Maurizio Macaluso et al., A Public Health Focus on Infertility 
Prevention, Detection, and Management, 93 FERTILITY & STERILITY 16.e1 
(2010). 
12 Id. at 16.e3–16.e4. 
13 At least one study has shown that not only do couples undergoing IVF 
and other forms of ART suffer from anxiety and emotional distress at higher 
rates than the general population, but also from a lower health-related quality 
of life, particularly in women with lower levels of education. Batool Rashidi, 
Ali Montazeri, Fatemeh Ramezanzadeh, Mamak Shariat, Nasrin Abedinia & 
Mahnaz Ashrafi, Health-related Quality of Life in Infertile Couples Receiving 
IVF or ICSI Treatment, 8:186 BMC HEALTH SERVICES RES. (2008), 
available at http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1472-6963-8-186 
.pdf. 
14 Macaluso et al., supra note 11, at 16.e1. 
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resulting from infertility treatment may require the "implementation of 
tertiary prevention programs."15 
Delaying childbirth also has implications for infertility rates.16 The 
current economic recession has led couples in the United States to delay 
childbearing.17 Birth rates in 2011 were low in the United States—the 
preliminary number of births was 1% less than in 2010.18 This may be 
indicative of a trend toward lower birth rate overall.19 While some would 
argue that limiting our population has benefits for our society, there has been 
no conclusive study showing that families want children less.20 Economic 
circumstances and infertility come together to create a situation in which 
couples are delaying childbirth. The majority of our society has recognized 
that building a family is the wish of many couples.21 The likelihood of a 
successful pregnancy in later years has improved over time, but risks persist 
and couples will continue to turn to assisted fertility treatment to seek a 
family. 
While infertility has negative public health effects, divorce has also been 
strongly linked with declining health. A 2009 study examining the effects of 
                                                             
15 Id. at 16.e3. 
16 Id. at 5.e1. 
17 Josh Sanburn, Why the Falling U.S. Birthrates Are So Troubling, 
TIME (Oct. 4, 2012), http://business.time.com/2012/10/04/why-the-falling-u-
s-birth-rates-are-so-troubling/. 
18 Hamilton, Martin & Ventura, supra note 9, at 3. 
19 Sanburn, supra note 17. 
20 Id. 
21 See Bragdon v. Abbot, 524 U.S. 624, 638–39 (1998), for a discussion 
of reproduction as a "major life activity" under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act. 
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changing marital status on four aspects of health,22 including chronic illness 
and depressive mood, revealed that those individuals in the study who had 
been previously married were in significantly worse health than those 
individuals who were currently married.23 Previously married individuals 
experienced 20% more chronic conditions and higher ratings of depressive 
symptoms than those who were married.24 In addition, stress resulting from 
divorce has lasting effects on their families. Restructuring of the family unit, 
changes to the financial responsibilities of each spouse, and stress resulting 
from separation may negatively impact children as well as the divorced 
spouses.25 
Advances in reproductive treatment have produced a number of 
treatment options under the ART umbrella, including In-Vitro Fertilization 
with Embryo Transfer ("IVF").26 The Society for Assisted Reproductive 
Treatment found that 99% of ART procedures are IVF.27 The popularity of 
IVF procedures stems from their overall effectiveness, low cost, and their 
availability for women with damaged fallopian tubes.28 The procedure is 
quite simple: the woman takes rounds of fertility drugs to promote the release 
of multiple eggs. Thereafter, the eggs are removed in an outpatient 
                                                             
22 The Four Aspects of Health include chronic conditions, mobility 
limitations, self-rated health, and depressive symptoms. 
23 Hughes & Waite, supra note 8, at 352, available at http://hsb.sagepub 
.com/content/50/3/344.full.pdf+html. 
24 Id. 
25 Lesia Oesterreich, Divorce Matters: Coping with Stress and Change, 
NATIONAL NETWORK FOR CHILDCARE, http://www.nncc.org/parent/ 
copestress.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2013). 
26 Assisted Reproductive Technologies, SOCIETY FOR ASSISTED 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY, http://www.sart.org/SART_Assisted_ 
Reproductive_Technologies (last visited Oct. 29, 2012). 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
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procedure—a needle inserted trans-vaginally, with ultrasound support, 
removes the eggs. These eggs are placed with the father's sperm in a petri 
dish and fertilization occurs.29 Because a number of eggs can be collected at 
one time and fertilized, patients may decide to freeze a number of embryos 
not immediately used after collection to facilitate treatment later on and 
reduce the number of invasive procedures. The treatment of these frozen 
                                                             
29 In-Vitro Fertilization Embryo-Transfer Explained, FERTILITY 
AUTHORITY, http://www.fertilityauthority.com/treatment/vitro-fertilization-
ivf (last visited Oct. 29, 2012); see also Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d. 174, 175 
(Ct. App. N.Y. 1998). The Court describes the process in more detail, 
Typically, the IVF procedure begins with hormonal stimulation 
of a woman's ovaries to produce multiple eggs. The eggs are 
then removed by laparoscopy or ultrasound-directed needle 
aspiration and placed in a glass dish, where sperm are 
introduced. Once a sperm cell fertilizes the egg, this fusion—or 
pre-zygote—divides until it reaches the four- to eight-cell 
stage, after which several pre-zygotes are transferred to the 
woman's uterus by a cervical catheter. If the procedure 
succeeds, an embryo will attach itself to the uterine wall, 
differentiate and develop into a fetus. As an alternative to 
immediate implantation, pre-zygotes may be cryopreserved 
indefinitely in liquid nitrogen for later use. Cryopreservation 
serves to reduce both medical and physical costs because eggs 
do not have to be retrieved with each attempted implantation, 
and delay may actually improve the chances of pregnancy. 
Id. at 175. 
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embryos30 in divorce of the couple that created them is the subject of much 
dispute in Pennsylvania and throughout the Nation.31 
III. PRE-EMBRYO CONTRACTS ARE NOT ENOUGH 
There are many advantages to using contractual agreements before 
beginning ART treatments, but this particular use of contracts is not yet 
widespread and does not fully encompass changing attitudes and 
circumstances. The contractual model has been adopted by a number of 
courts addressing the distribution of frozen embryos. The case of Davis v. 
Davis first established that agreements between progenitors32 are valid, 
binding and enforceable when disagreements arise between parties.33 In 
Davis, the Supreme Court of Tennessee examined a dispute between a 
husband and wife regarding the disposition of their frozen embryos upon 
divorce. At the trial court level, Mary Davis wished to implant the embryos 
and bear more children. Junior Davis wished to leave the embryos in their 
frozen state until he could make a decision about becoming a father outside of 
                                                             
30 The fertilized eggs at this stage are called a variety of names including 
"pre-embryo" in frozen embryo debate case law, the Centers for Disease 
Control (CDC) uses the term "embryo" to denote a fertilized egg, Infertility 
FAQs, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/Infertility/Index.htm 
(last visited Dec. 19, 2013). This note will refer to fertilized eggs frozen for 
future use as "embryos." 
31 See generally Reber, 42 A.3d 1131 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012); Marisa G. 
Zizzi, The Pre-embryo Prenup: A Proposed Pennsylvania Statute Adopting 
Contractual Approach to Resolving Disputes Concerning the Disposition of 
Frozen Embryos, 21 WIDENER L.J. 391 (2012); John Springer, Divorced 
Couple Battles over Frozen Embryos, TODAY NEWS (May 31, 2007), 
http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/18958324/ns/today-today_news/t/divorced-
couple-battles-over-frozen-embryos/#.UI7-xGk6Xok. 
32 Progenitor—an ancestor in the direct line. MERRIAM-WEBSTER 
DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/progenitor. In 
frozen embryo disputes, a "progenitor" refers to a party who has donated 
biological material to create an embryo. 
33 Davis v. Davis, 824 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992). 
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marriage.34 The trial court found in favor of Mary Davis, but the Court of 
Appeals reversed deciding that Junior Davis had a "constitutionally protected 
right not to beget a child where no pregnancy has taken place."35 On appeal, 
the circumstances between the couple had changed as Mary Davis no longer 
wished to implant the embryos, but instead wanted to donate the embryos to 
another couple. Junior Davis wished to have the embryos destroyed.36 The 
Supreme Court of Tennessee did not view embryos as "persons" or 
"property," and found that where the couples lacked a contract providing for 
some kind of procedure for disposition of the embryos upon divorce, the 
interests of both parties must be balanced.37 Applying the balancing test, the 
Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeal reasoning that Junior Davis' 
interest in avoiding parenthood and fathering a child that would not live with 
both parents outweighed Mary Davis' interest in donating the pre-embryos to 
another couple.38 
In Davis, the Court concluded that where an agreement regarding 
disposition has been made in the event of any contingencies such as death, 
divorce, and financial problems, the agreement "should be presumed valid 
and should be enforced as between the progenitors."39 Additionally, where 
changed circumstances arise, modifications to the agreement may clarify the 
wishes of the parties. But, if no modifications are made, the original 
agreement should be enforced.40 Many other courts have relied upon the 
ruling in Davis with regard to the enforceability of contracts governing the 
disposition of embryos. 
                                                             
34 Id. at 589. 
35 Id. (citing Davis v. Davis, 1990 WL 130807, at 2 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
1990)). 
36 Id. at 590. 
37 Id. at 597 and 603. 
38 Davis, 824 S.W.2d at 604. 
39 Id. at 597. 
40 Id. 
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In 1998, the Court of Appeals in New York also addressed the issue of 
contracts governing the distribution of embryos,41 finding that where an 
agreement specifically discussed the distribution of frozen embryos, a 
contractual interpretation of ambiguous terms in a consent form and written 
disposition agreement was appropriate.42 In Kass v. Kass, a couple entered 
into an IVF contract when the wife began experiencing infertility and an 
inability to bear children naturally. One of the four contracts signed by the 
parties before beginning IVF, titled "INFORMED CONSENT FORM No.2—
ADDENDUM NO. 2 1: CRYOPRESERVATION—STATEMENT OF 
DISPOSITION" stated, 
In the event that we no longer wish to initiate a 
pregnancy or are unable to make a decision regarding 
the disposition of our stored, frozen pre-zygotes, we now 
indicate our desire for the disposition of our pre-zygotes 
. . . . Our frozen pre-zygotes may be examined by the 
IVF program for biological studies and be disposed of by 
the IVF program for approved research investigation as 
determined by the IVF program.43 
The court of appeals adopted the view of the Supreme Court of Tennessee 
that written agreements between progenitors are valid and should be 
enforced.44 The court of appeals engaged in contract interpretation, finding 
the parties clearly expressed their intent in the contracts, and affirmed the 
decision of the trial court to enforce the agreement.45 The Supreme Court of 
Washington also addressed the merits of contract interpretation in Litowitz v. 
Litowitz. The Court found that where one spouse is a progenitor of the 
embryo and one is not, a valid contract may establish ownership rights in the 
                                                             
41 Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 174 (Ct. App. N.Y. 1998). 
42 Id. at 180. 
43 Id. at 176–77 (emphasis added). 
44 Id. at 180. 
45 Id. at 182. 
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other spouse, and not the egg donor, in the event of disposition upon 
divorce.46 
While contract interpretation provides a clear test for determining the 
distribution of frozen embryos post-divorce, some courts have rejected the 
enforceability of certain consent form contract provisions.47 For example, the 
Supreme Court of Massachusetts found that IVF Clinic consent forms, the 
most common form of contract used by parties in embryo distribution cases, 
were unenforceable when they failed to indicate that they were binding on the 
parties and where couples had no intent to be bound by the contract.48 Even 
though contracts can in some situations be enforceable and provide a clear 
solution for distribution, problems remain. Generally, consent forms vary 
between IVF providers, and there is the possibility that couples are not 
seeking legal advice when signing these agreements. Further, the 
uncomfortable nature of discussing a potential, future divorce during the 
stress of choosing to undergo IVF, may prevent contract formation in the first 
place. 
Although IVF consent forms serve as medical informed consent, it has 
been argued that making a contractual decision regarding disposition before 
the major life events that follow IVF treatment (pregnancy, pregnancy loss, 
interpersonal events, and separation) amounts to uninformed consent.49 
During IVF, parties generally do not think about the effect of major life 
                                                             
46 Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261, 269 (Wash. 2002). 
47 Contract interpretation as well as alternative dispute resolution may 
avoid the necessity of determining legal status of frozen embryos. See Davis, 
824 S.W.2d at 774 (declining to define the legal status of frozen embryos); 
See generally Angela K. Upchurch, The Deep Freeze: A Critical Examination 
of the Resolution of Frozen Embryo Disputes Through the Adversarial 
Process, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 395, 400 (2005). 
48 A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1057 (Mass. 2000). 
49 Brandon J. Bankowski, Ann D. Lyerly, Ruth R. Faden & Edward E. 
Wallach, The Social Implications of Embryo Cryopreservation, 84 FERTILITY 
& STERILITY 823, 827–28 (2005). 
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events that could lead to divorce.50 One study has shown that as many as 71% 
of couples change their preferences for disposition from their initial 
preferences before treatment.51 In In re Marriage of Witten, the Supreme 
Court of Iowa discussed and adopted the contemporaneous mutual consent 
model, an alternative to the contractual model and balancing interests test.52 
In Witten, the parties signed an informed consent document providing that 
release or disposition of the embryos would only take place with the signed 
approval of both parties.53 The Wittens could not come to an agreement 
regarding the treatment of the embryos.54 The district court enforced the 
contract provision and the wife appealed.55 After discussing the merits of the 
three approaches (contract, contemporaneous mutual consent, and balancing 
test), the court declined to enforce the contract. Instead the Court followed the 
contemporaneous mutual consent model to reach the same conclusion as the 
District Court, and enjoined the parties from transferring, releasing, or using 
the frozen embryos.56 The contemporaneous mutual consent model is based 
on the concept that, in decisions where people tend to act more on feeling 
rather than rational logic, it may be impossible to make an informed decision 
to "relinquish a right in advance of the time the right is to be exercised."57 
Under this approach, if a couple cannot come to an agreement on the 
distribution of their frozen embryos, nothing will be done until an agreement 
                                                             
50 Id. 
51 Susan C. Klock, Sandra Sheinin & Ralph R. Kazer, The Disposition of 
Unused Frozen Embryos, 345 NEW ENG. J. MED. 69, 69–70 (2001). 
52 In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003). 
53 Id. at 772–73. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 773. 
56 Id. at 783. 
57 Id. at 777 (citing Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and 
Contemporaneous Choice: An Inalienable Rights Approach to Frozen 
Embryo Disputes, 48 MINN. L. REV. 55, 98 (1999)). 
J o u r n a l  o f  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  






P a g e  | 91 
 
ISSN 2164-7976 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/pjephl.2013.64 
http://pjephl.law.pitt.edu 
Embryo Debate  
Winter 2013 
is reached, and the embryos will remain frozen until they are no longer viable 
or storage is no longer available.58 
Even though the court in Witten declined to enforce the terms of the 
contract and adopted the contemporaneous mutual consent model, some 
issues still arise from the holding. With its application, it becomes clear that 
the parties may be stuck in a limbo without reaching a mutual decision for the 
foreseeable future. This can be particularly difficult for parties without 
children who intend to divorce quickly and move on. Additionally, if an 
agreement cannot be reached before storage becomes unavailable or the 
embryos become unviable there will be pressure to make a decision and 
parties may suffer as a result of having to make a hasty decision. While 
judgments in adversarial divorce situations can include appreciation of the 
concerns about choice, changed circumstances, and binding parties when 
their attitudes have changed, collaborative law may provide answers that not 
only promote justice but also mediate public health policy concerns in these 
disputes. 
IV. COLLABORATIVE LAW'S PLACE FOLLOWING REBER V. REISS 
Collaborative law is a form of alternative dispute resolution that focuses 
on allowing each party to feel empowered in the divorce process. There is a 
unique opportunity for using collaborative law in frozen embryo disputes in 
divorce, rather than other forms of ADR or contract resolution. First, this 
section will proceed with an analysis of property distribution under 
Pennsylvania law and an explanation of related alternative dispute resolution 
methods. Second, this section will present an argument for the use of 
collaborative law in frozen embryo disputes. 
                                                             
58 Id. at 782. 
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A. DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL PROPERTY IN PENNSYLVANIA 
With some exceptions, Pennsylvania law defines marital property as all 
property acquired by either party during the marriage.59 Frozen embryos 
                                                             
59 Marital Property is defined as, 
. . . "marital property" means all property acquired by either 
party during the marriage and the increase in value of any 
nonmarital property acquired pursuant to paragraphs (1) and 
(3) as measured and determined under subsection (a.1). 
However, marital property does not include: 
(1) Property acquired prior to marriage or property acquired in 
exchange for property acquired prior to the marriage. 
(2) Property excluded by valid agreement of the parties entered 
into before, during or after the marriage. 
(3) Property acquired by gift, except between spouses, bequest, 
devise or descent or property acquired in exchange for such 
property. 
(4) Property acquired after final separation until the date of 
divorce, except for property acquired in exchange for marital 
assets. 
(5) Property which a party has sold, granted, conveyed or 
otherwise disposed of in good faith and for value prior to the 
date of final separation. 
(6) Veterans' benefits exempt from attachment, levy or seizure 
pursuant to the act of September 2, 1958 (Public Law 85-857, 
72 Stat. 1229), as amended, except for those benefits received 
by a veteran where the veteran has waived a portion of his 
military retirement pay in order to receive veterans' 
compensation. 
(7) Property to the extent to which the property has been 
mortgaged or otherwise encumbered in good faith for value 
prior to the date of final separation. 
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acquired during marriage have been determined to be martial property.60 
Pennsylvania, like many states, takes the equitable distribution approach to 
distributing marital property upon divorce.61 Under this regime, certain 
considerations are taken to balance the interests of the parties in dividing 
marital property. Considerations include age, health, income, liabilities and 
needs of the parties,62 economic circumstances of each party,63 and whether 
the party retains custody of any dependent minor children.64 However, where 
frozen embryos are the property to be divided, there are additional 
considerations including infertility of one or both spouses, potential 
opportunities to have new children, and remarriage of the divorced spouses. 
With the decision in Reber v. Reiss, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania 
incorporated the balancing test approach adopted in Davis, concluding that 
the infertility and interest in conceiving of defendant Reiss outweighed the 
interest of Reber to not procreate.65 While the trial court before Reber v. Reiss 
touched on public health concerns, including future child support and custody 
should Reiss die, this case did not eliminate public health concerns for 
distribution. The adversarial divorce continues to promote stress, ill will, and 
clouded judgment regarding important decisions such as embryo distribution. 
                                                                                                                              
(8) Any payment received as a result of an award or settlement 
for any cause of action or claim which accrued prior to the 
marriage or after the date of final separation regardless of when 
the payment was received. 
23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3501(a) (2005). 
60 Reber, 42 A.3d at 1133 (where both parties and trial court agreed that 
the pre-embryos are marital property subject to equitable distribution). 
61 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3502 (2005). 
62 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3502(a)(3) (2005). 
63 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3502(a)(10) (2005). 
64 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3502(a)(11) (2005). 
65 Reber, 42 A.3d at 1142. 
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B. ISSUES WITH THE ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM IN DIVORCE 
As previously mentioned, the adversarial system fails to address the 
greater social implications and emotional stress that a dispute over the 
disposition of frozen embryos raises. As of 2005, as many as 88% of frozen 
embryos were stored, awaiting the future use intended by the parents who 
created them.66 When divorce arises, tensions are high and often the 
adversarial format of divorce proceedings exacerbates the stresses that come 
from leaving a long term, significant marital relationship. Divorces are 
generally matters of public record, so the parties feel a lack of privacy in what 
has always been considered a personal matter.67 Lawyers may oversimplify 
the matter into legal issues, where the clients experience a more complicated 
dispute based on emotional reactions and marital history. Furthermore, the 
monetary cost of divorce, including attorney fees, is enough to set both 
parties on edge.68 
In her 2005 law review article, Deep Freeze: A Critical Examination of 
the Resolution of Frozen Embryo Disputes Through the Adversarial Process, 
Angela Upchurch argues that the adversarial court system in past decisions 
has focused on the biological parenthood consequences of distributing frozen 
embryos, rather than looking at the actual intentions and motivations of the 
progenitors.69 This reliance of the court in examining the biological 
relationship between the parents and the potential life completely disregards 
the parties' actual beliefs, motives, and intentions when determining what to 
do with their frozen embryos.70 In her article, Upchurch offers alternative 
dispute resolution (ADR) as a solution to the failings of the adversarial 
system. Often the court in embryo distribution cases fails to "pinpoint, after 
                                                             
66 Bankowski, Lyerly, Faden & Wallach, supra note 49, at 825. 
67 PAULINE H. TESLER, COLLABORATIVE LAW: ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE 
RESOLUTION IN DIVORCE WITHOUT LITIGATION 1 (2d ed. 2001). 
68 Id. 
69 Upchurch, supra note 47, at 422–24. 
70 Id. at 424. 
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the relationship between the progenitors has deteriorated, the basis for each 
progenitor's decision to undergo IVF."71 The court, taking a narrow approach 
by examining the dispute through the lens of property law, may not provide 
the couples with as positive a determination as that which can be found in 
ADR.72 Upchurch points out that a form of ADR could more successfully 
help the couple reach a decision by examining a broader arsenal of interests 
such as religious beliefs regarding the status of the embryo and any hierarchy 
of interests the couple would like to establish.73 In addition, Pauline Tesler, 
collaborative divorce lawyer and author, argues that depending on a judge or 
lawyer to have the "special capacity to resolve the most difficult, the most 
complex of all family problems" perhaps assumes too much of our adversarial 
system.74 With divorce becoming more prevalent, alternative dispute 
resolution has been a helpful advancement in family law to ease couples into 
the divorce transition. 
As a substitute to the adversarial approach to family law disputes, many 
couples turn to various forms of ADR. ADR places the decision making 
power with the parties themselves, not a judge, and includes third parties that 
are not judges who may provide support in the process.75 Parties who 
engaged in alternative dispute resolution experienced more satisfaction, were 
more willing to comply with the agreement, and had an overall more pleasant 
experience than those engaged in adversarial litigation.76 
                                                             
71 Id. at 433–34. 
72 See id. at 434. 
73 Id. 
74 TESLER, supra note 67, at 2 (citing JANET JOHNSON & VIVIENNE 
ROSEBY, IN THE NAME OF THE CHILD 223 (1998)). 
75 Janet A. Flaccus, Mediation of Divorce Disputes—Is This the 
Solution?, 2009 ARK. L. NOTES 79, 79 (2009). 
76 Id. at 80. 
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C. MEDIATION AND COLLABORATIVE LAW, GENERALLY 
Mediation is a popular form of ADR often utilized in family law 
settings, and is generally characterized as allowing, "parties [to] participate in 
a negotiation using a neutral third party as an aid for communicating their 
offers."77 The disputing parties, along with legal counsel (if desired), work 
with a third party to come to a signed, written agreement.78 The process can 
take as little time as one day or as long as a number of weeks.79 The 
advantage of mediation is the flexibility the clients have regarding the cost 
and the outcome of the mediation. Specifically, the parties may or may not 
come to a binding agreement, and may engage in mediation in "the very early 
stages of their dispute or days before trial."80 While mediation is a beneficial 
form of ADR, issues have emerged that keep it from becoming the foremost 
choice in addressing family law disputes. For example, "imbalances in power 
. . . emotional attitude and stability of parties, as well as dishonesty, foot-
dragging and other less-than-good faith orientations to the mediation . . . can 
compromise the even-handedness and stability of the mediated outcome."81 
Collaborative law is a relatively new development in ADR that seeks to 
remedy some of the criticisms of mediation. Unlike mediation, collaborative 
law requires that an attorney who serves "as [an] active legal [advisor] and 
negotiator" represent each party.82 The collaborative law process begins with 
an agreement between the parties, stipulating that the goal of the process is to 
reach a settlement and that the parties will respectfully and voluntarily 
                                                             
77 Elizabeth F. Beyer, A Pragmatic Look at Mediation and Collaborative 
Law as Alternatives to Family Law Litigation, 40 ST. MARY'S L.J. 303, 310 
(2008). 
78 Id. at 311. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 314. 
81 TESLER, supra note 67, at 3 n.8. 
82 Id. at 9. 
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participate in this process to reach that goal.83 The collaborative law process 
is one involving a number of meetings, including meetings between a 
particular party and their collaborative attorney, meetings between the two 
collaborative attorneys representing the parties, and four-way meetings 
involving both parties and their respective counsel.84 Unlike the adversarial 
system, collaborative law utilizes many factors in addition to established legal 
principles. Past experiences, needs and wishes, and future interests of the 
parties are all laid out on the table and whatever weight the parties feel is 
appropriate in their circumstance is afforded to each. 
Furthermore, the attorneys engaged in the process are prevented from 
ethical dilemmas regarding pushing clients toward litigation. Through the use 
of a "no court" agreement signed by the parties and their collaborative 
attorneys, it is agreed that the attorneys of both parties are barred from 
participating in any legal proceedings if an agreement cannot be reached.85 
While there are concerns about parties being coerced into an undesirable 
settlement and higher costs associated with seeking new counsel for trial, 
proponents of the collaborative model see it as a powerful tool for 
maintaining civility in divorce proceedings. Many proponents believe it is the 
only way for the parties to be empowered and confident in negotiations.86 
With both parties and their attorneys focused on reaching a peaceful 
settlement and the threat of litigation staved off, "advice, representation, and 
advocacy" become the essence of the process.87 Collaborative law, therefore, 
provides greater support to clients than mediation because the parties' 
attorneys are truly advocates, rather than neutral third parties. The additional 
                                                             
83 Id. at 4. 
84 KATHERINE E. STONER, DIVORCE WITHOUT COURT: A GUIDE TO 
MEDIATION & COLLABORATIVE LAW 91 (Emily Doskow ed., 2d ed. 2009). 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 56. 
87 TESLER, supra note 67, at 9. 
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training often required by collaborative law organizations,88 can increase the 
confidence of the parties to reach a peaceful settlement while addressing the 
emotionally taxing circumstances.89 Further, collaborative attorneys may 
introduce other parties to help negotiations between the spouses, such as a 
financial analyst or mental health professional who will work with both 
clients, often in a group session.90 In addition to significantly reducing the 
costs of traditional divorce, collaborative systems also produce a 
collaborative team that supports the couple and reinforces the goals and 
wishes of the parties. The collaborative team establishes an effective dynamic 
through which the couple can seek to negotiate, communicate, and reach 
peaceful determinations of not only property distribution but also custody 
agreements, financial settlements, and the relationship the parties will have 
following divorce. 
D. WHY COLLABORATIVE DIVORCE SHOULD BE UTILIZED IN 
DISPUTES INVOLVING FROZEN EMBRYOS 
While there may be preventative measures such as contract formation 
that couples should utilize before entering into IVF or other means of ART, 
many couples are facing divorce with no such agreements. A process that will 
address both the emotional and social implications of engaging in IVF and 
the reasons for divorce will achieve greater results than those offered by the 
adversarial system.91 While mediation allows the parties to reach a decision 
with a neutral party mediator, collaborative law provides greater incentives to 
                                                             
88 Some collaborative law organizations in Pennsylvania include 
Collaborative Lawyers of Southern Pennsylvania, http://clasplaw.org; 
Pennsylvania Collaborative Law Practice, http://www.pacollaborativepractice 
.com; and Collaborative Professionals of Central Pennsylvania, http://www 
.collaborativelawpa.com. 
89 See generally TESLER, supra note 67. 
90 Kate Scharff & Lisa Herrick, Navigating Emotional Currents in 
Collaborative Divorce xxi (American Bar Association 2010). 
91 Upchurch, supra note 47, at 433. 
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reach a result both parties can comply with.92 Particularly where conflicting 
interests, such as the interest in conceiving a child versus the right to not 
procreate, exist, collaborative law can provide a better basis for negotiation. 
Where the parties suffer from a power imbalance regarding particular 
issues up for discussion, the presence of a collaborative professional provides 
structure and confidence to each party.93 A collaborative attorney will be able 
to support their client when he or she is expressing their wishes in the face of 
the other party's disagreement.94 Where a couple is battling over the right to 
own or use the frozen embryos, a power imbalance may arise, especially 
when combined with the balancing test used in Davis and Reber. In Reber, 
the wife's wish to use the frozen embryos outweighed the husband's right to 
not procreate. There is an imbalance when pitting these rights against each 
other. The couple may benefit from collaborative divorce where they each 
have a trained collaborative attorney to support them and mitigate the 
imbalance. Without taking on a biological parenthood perspective, the couple 
may have been able to discuss this issue with the privacy of a non-disclosure 
agreement.95 The parties are more empowered when they are able to make 
their own decisions regarding the results of the IVF treatment. That 
empowerment is diminished when the parties engage in adversarial divorce.96 
Ultimately, public health interests will be promoted by instituting a 
statutory provision providing for collaborative divorce in cases where couples 
cannot agree on embryo distribution. As previously mentioned, when 
collaborative attorneys bring other collaborative professionals into the 
process, particularly mental health professionals, couples may benefit from 
these counselors' deeper understanding of the unconscious attitudes and 
                                                             
92 TESLER, supra note 67, at 16–17. 
93 See STONER, supra note 84, at 92. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 25. 
96 Id. at 28. 
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beliefs that are emphasized in collaborative divorce.97 An attention to not 
only the individual parties seeking divorce, but also the third entity created by 
their marriage and union as a couple may assuage the negative emotional and 
physical repercussions that are exacerbated by adversarial divorce.98 Results 
from the four-way conferences in collaborative divorce are maximized when 
the attorneys focus on reducing anger, hostility, and other negative emotions 
that result from the breakdown of the marital relationship.99 Simply put, 
having collaborative law focus on the certain feelings, emotions, and 
circumstances of a couple seeking divorce after IVF treatment will most 
likely leave the couple with a less negative mental and physical health 
response to the divorce.100 
Additionally, collaborative divorce with regard to the distribution of 
frozen embryos may also promote responsible and careful treatment of the 
embryos. Davis established a property interest in the embryos with "special 
respect" and collaborative law may be able to provide that standard by 
focusing more holistically on the effects of divorce on the family unit. Should 
a couple seeking divorce post-IVF treatment, collaborative professionals may 
be more equipped to assist couples in a decision to distribute, destroy, or store 
frozen embryos particularly when blended families and existing children are 
involved. The collaborative approach utilizes a number of factors beyond 
those typically used by courts such as subjective fairness, past experiences, 
previous actions of the parties, and changed circumstances. Therefore the 
collaborative approach may more flexibly address the concerns of the entire 
family unit than the balancing approaches used in Davis and Reber.101 
                                                             
97 Scharff & Herrick, supra note 90, at xxiii–xxiv. 
98 See id. at 18–20. 
99 SUSAN SWAIM DAICOFF, COMPREHENSIVE LAW PRACTICE 166 
(Carolina Academic Press 2011). 
100 Id. 
101 See generally Upchurch, supra note 47. 
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V. PROPOSED SOLUTION 
In states where contracts have been held to be binding and 
enforceable,102 providing clearer guidelines for consent agreements signed by 
the parties when they participate in an IVF procedure, would be an excellent 
way to promote clear interpretation of progenitors' wishes upon divorce. 
These contracts should address not only the disposition in the event a spouse 
should die or the couple no longer requires or wishes to continue treatment, 
but should also address the distribution in the event of divorce. Counselors or 
attorneys should be available to discuss the consequences of these provisions 
and encourage thoughtful, respectful, open, and honest communication 
between the couple regarding negative life events that may occur during the 
time between beginning and the end of the IVF process.103 In addition, 
consent agreements should include a provision stipulating that it is binding 
upon the parties, and, as this article has argued, should provide for 
collaborative divorce proceedings if an agreement on the treatment of the 
frozen embryos cannot be reached. 
States such as Pennsylvania, which have not adopted statutory 
provisions for the distribution of frozen human embryos, should consider 
adopting a statutory provision recommending some form of alternative 
dispute resolution, particularly collaborative law. While mediation is cost-
effective for those parties who do not wish to acquire legal counsel, the 
collaborative law process provides greater incentives to reach an amicable 
settlement and avoid litigation at a more cost effective rate than traditional 
divorce.104 Having both parties represented by a legal advocate who is bound 
                                                             
102 See, e.g., Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 174; Litowitz, 48 P.3d at 269. 
103 As discussed previously, it has been argued that the occurrence of 
negative life events makes making an "informed decision" regarding future 
events difficult. However, engaging in this discussion before entering 
treatment may educate the couple and promote a more peaceful agreement 
process later. See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180. 
104 STONER, supra note 84, at 25. 
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by the collaborative law agreement to seek a peaceful settlement will 
encourage open and honest participation of both parties.105 
Although litigation will provide a consistent ruling on the issue of frozen 
embryo distribution in divorce, as Reber v. Reiss has begun to do, 
collaborative law will help courts avoid the need to define the legal status of 
frozen embryos. In addition, couples who wish to refrain from using contracts 
memorializing their intents and beliefs before IVF would benefit from a 
collaborative process that takes more than the black letter of the law into 
account. Particularly where a jurisdiction has adopted the contemporaneous 
mutual consent model, if both parties have equally compelling interests in the 
frozen embryos collaborative law may help avoid deadlock of these disputes. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The distribution of frozen embryos upon divorce is varied across the 
board. Courts have encouraged and interpreted contracts entered into by the 
hopeful parents. Others have engaged in balancing tests. Others still 
encourage maintaining the status quo until a mutual agreement can be 
reached. Regardless of these court-adopted solutions, little is being done to 
truly address the very real emotions, interests, intents, and ultimately public 
health consequences of distributing frozen embryos. This article has posited 
that, following Reber v. Reiss, the interest-based collaborative law approach 
may serve as a better, more economical means of divorce than adversarial 
divorce where frozen embryos are concerned. Infertility is a public health 
issue in this country because it has negative mental and physical health 
effects on those who suffer from it. Additionally, prevention and treatment of 
infertility also have their own negative health effects. A number of studies 
have shown that negative life events, such as divorce, may have lasting 
medical repercussions on the divorcing population. These repercussions are 
likely exacerbated by the adversarial system. 
                                                             
105 See TESLER, supra note 67, at 115 (describing collaborative law as an 
interest-based negotiation, rather than positional bargaining). 
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In sum, the distribution of embryos in the adversarial system may lead to 
more negative health results than positive. Through collaborative divorce, 
couples may experience a more civil, less stressful, and less expensive means 
of determining exactly what to do with frozen embryos when the marital 
relationship has fallen apart. The Pennsylvania legislature should take the 
public health concerns discussed in this paper seriously, and develop a 
statutory provision recommending collaborative divorce for these emotional 
and sometimes hostile situations involving frozen embryos. 
